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Abstract:  Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of 
Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness.  
The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to 
arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the 
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to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.  
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Klein &  Barron (2016) (henceforth K & B) propose that insects and all the other arthropods 
have primary consciousness, as do all the vertebrates, judging from some similarities of 
brain structure and function in these two great clades of animals. We have written a book 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a) with similar ideas, published at almost the same time as K & B’s 
original presentation of their thesis in PNAS in March/April of this year (Barron & Klein, 
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2016). Our book focused more on vertebrates whereas K & B focused on insects, so the two 
works nicely complement each other.  
 
Our first major point of agreement is that we all view consciousness as a natural 
phenomenon that can be explained by empirical science without invoking any new 
fundamental forces.  
 
Second, we agree — contrary to the dominant view in consciousness studies today (Koch, 
Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016) — that consciousness does not need a mammalian 
cerebral cortex, but can instead come from subcortical regions of the midbrain and 
forebrain of vertebrates as well as  from comparable brain regions of insects.  
 
Third, we really do agree with K & B on the likelihood of insect consciousness: starting with 
vertebrates we listed twelve traits that indicate the presence of consciousness, and then 
found that insects have all but one of them (see the Tables in Chapter 9 of Feinberg & 
Mallatt, 2016a). 
  
We did point out the one way insects failed, in that their tiny brains may be too small for 
consciousness, because this is sure to be an ongoing point of contention and doubt in the 
field. However, we concluded that insects are “probably conscious” and we largely treated 
them as such through the rest of our book. Thus, we are not major doubters, as K & B seem 
to imply by saying we are “equivocal on whether insects have the capacity” for 
consciousness (p. 9). 
  
A. Strong points of their theory 
 
A1. The idea is coherent and interesting. To quote from pages 7 and 8 of K & B: 
     
“In summary, there are significant parallels between the functional organization of the 
insect brain and that of the vertebrate midbrain [and basal ganglia as a] behavioral core 
control system. Both systems have specialized regions for processing the position of the 
moving animal in space. In both systems, action selection is resolved by combining 
information on [body] position with information on the environment, the relevance of 
stimuli in the environment to the animal, and the [inner physiological] state of the animal. . 
. .the channels of information are sufficiently unified such that the system as a whole 
creates a functional representation of the state of the mobile animal in space as a solution 
for effective decision making. . . .processing of this kind supports the capacity for a 
subjective experience of the environment.” 
   
This fits our idea that the brain region for primary consciousness receives and integrates 
information from the many kinds of complex senses and builds this input into a map-like 
representation of the world and body, a subjective mental image that is used to guide and 
direct the behavior of the conscious animal. Our view emphasizes the sensory side of the 
equation whereas K & B follow Bjorn Merker (2005, 2007) in emphasizing the motor side; 
but we certainly recognize the strong correlation between consciousness and high mobility 
in the animal phyla they pointed out.  
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Our original idea was that conscious animals use their complex senses of vision, hearing, 
smell, touch, etc. to model the world when they are immobile and still as well as when they 
are moving, meaning mobility cannot be the whole story. But mobility is important, and we 
like the Merker-inspired statement that consciousness evolved to “create a neural 
simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space” (Barron & Klein, 2016). It adds a 
helpful new dimension to our thinking. In fact, Merker, Barron, and Klein inspired us to add 
the following to our list of traits for judging whether an animal clade has consciousness: 
“Demonstrated ability to select actions directed toward a targeted goal in space (even 
without a continuous stimulus to follow).” This ability includes elements of planning, of 
feeling an attraction, and motivation, as well as mentally mapping the world. This case is 
best presented on pages 10-11 of K & B’s target article.  
 
A2. Convincing comparison of insect and vertebrate brain regions for consciousness. As 
K & B have shown, the central complex of the insect brain (CX) receives and processes 
mapped information from almost all the senses and uses this sensory information for 
spatial orientation, as does the superior colliculus/optic tectum of the vertebrate brain. 
Thus K & B logically equate these as sites of mental-image formation. Besides this “CX = 
tectum” equation, K & B also showed that the CX and nearby “protocerebrum” are where 
different types of sensory input compete to decide which motor program to perform. Such 
decision making for action selection is likewise performed by the basal ganglia of the 
vertebrate brain. Thus it is logical to equate the CX and “protocerebrum” with the basal 
ganglia, for consciousness-driven action. They also document the involvement of CX and 
“protocerebrum” in rewards and motivations for goal-directed behaviors, another similarity 
to the vertebrate basal ganglia. Their detailed knowledge of arthropod brains allowed K & B 
to identify specific brain areas and use them as evidence for insect consciousness. This is an 
advance over what we accomplished in our book.  
 
To strengthen K & B’s case even more, we will point out several more similarities between 
insects and vertebrates — in olfaction, memory, and the affective feelings of like and dislike. 
The olfactory similarities will be considered first.  
  
In insects the olfactory pathway differs from the other sensory pathways in sending little or 
no input to the CX on its way to the higher brain (mushroom bodies: Pfeiffer & Homberg, 
2014). Similarly, in fish and amphibians olfaction is the only sense whose main projection is 
not to the optic tectum (the CX-equivalent) but to the higher brain (the cerebral pallium, 
which is the homologue of the cortex of mammals: Miyasaka et al., 2014; Mori, Manabe, 
Narikiyo, & Onisawa, 2013; Wullimann & Vernier, 2009).  
 
Turning to the similarities in memory, much olfactory information goes directly to the 
brain’s main regions for memory and learning in both insects and vertebrates, to the 
mushroom bodies and the hippocampus, respectively (Brodal, 2010; Galizia, 2014). Such a 
strong association between the smell and memory circuits should be universal among 
conscious animals because smell is the only sense whose stimuli linger, meaning the scent 
must be remembered in order for a long-gone source to be identified (pp. 84 and 115, 
Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). 
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Regarding affective consciousness, we searched the literature and found behavioral 
evidence that insects experience basic likes and dislikes, as do all the vertebrates (Chapters 
8 and 9, Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). More specifically, insects meet five criteria, most of 
which are based on an expert capacity to learn operantly to approach rewards and avoid 
punishments. Thus, the behavioral evidence buttresses K & B’s claim for insect 
consciousness.  
    
K & B recognize that arousal and selective attention are important for consciousness; they 
list some brain regions for these processes in insects. They have not compared these to 
vertebrate regions, however, so we will offer a few preliminary comparisons. Arousal 
determines the level of consciousness, and in insects, dopaminergic neurons in the CX are 
involved in it (Liu et al., 2012; Pfeiffer & Homberg, 2014). In vertebrates, on the other hand, 
the reticular formation in the brainstem is involved, as is the basal forebrain; the relevant 
neurons produce acetylcholine and norepinephrine (Fuller et al., 2011). Other than having 
medial locations in the brain, these arousal-associated structures of insects and vertebrates 
show no obvious similarities. Attention is a part of, or closely related to, consciousness 
because sensations are most likely to enter consciousness when attended to. In insects the 
attention circuits are in the “protocerebrum” (p. 4904, Barron & Klein, 2016), with visual 
attention also involving early processing in the optic lobes (Paulk et al., 2004). In fish and 
amphibians, attention involves the isthmus nuclei in the brainstem interacting with the 
nearby optic tectum (Dutta & Gutfreund, 2014; p. 110, Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a; Gruberg 
et al., 2006). These regions may be comparable in insects and vertebrates, although the 
vertebrate tectum is farther along the visual pathway than are insect optic lobes. More 
studies are needed.  
 
A3. Primary consciousness. K & B nicely explained the concept of primary consciousness 
as the minimal level of subjective experience or “basic awareness of the world without 
further reflection on that awareness.” Inspired by Morin (2006) and Merker (2007), K & B 
state it especially well, making it clear that insects do not monitor their own cognitive 
processes nor are they self-aware. K & B were wise to say that insects probably have 
nothing comparable to the cerebral cortex of mammals. This clarification should prevent a 
lot of confusion in future critiques of their work: they do not claim that insects have human 
higher consciousness. We had missed the “without further reflection” part in our own 
definition of primary consciousness, and appreciate that K & B emphasize it. 
    
A4. Lower limit on consciousness. Those of us who believe that animals other than humans 
are conscious face the problem of finding the lower limit. Are rats conscious? Reptiles? Fish? 
Worms? Amoebas? Bacteria? K & B help to set this limit with their argument that nematode 
roundworms, representing the primitive state of (bilaterian) animals, cannot be conscious 
due to limitations of sensory detection and sensory processing. With just simple photo-, 
chemo-, and mechano-receptors, nematodes “have no spatial senses. They have no capacity 
to locate themselves in their environment or to detect the relative position of objects 
around them” (p. 10). They do not simulate the world around them into a big picture, so 
they cannot form goals or anticipatory plans of how to act in the world. They use an 
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undirected food-foraging strategy called area-restricted search (Hills, 2006) and cannot 
perform directed motions except in response to immediate stimuli.  
 
Most of the other invertebrate groups also lack elaborate eyes, olfactory organs, ears, etc. so 
they also fall in this non-conscious category. We came to the same conclusion, but adding K 
& B’s idea that animals need to “model the world in order to plan targeted behaviors” adds a 
strong new dimension to the explanation.  
 
A5. Tectal interactions with the basal ganglia. We did not know that the superior 
colliculus/optic tectum extensively communicates back and forth with the basal ganglia. We 
appreciate K & B pointing this out because it means that the tectum, with its world map 
based on multisensory inputs, can influence which of the stored motor programs will be 
executed. It explains how primary consciousness can lead to complex motor sequences and 
behaviors. K & B cite the references on mammals, but the tectal-basal ganglia 
interconnections seem to characterize all vertebrates because they are also documented in 
fish and amphibians (de Arriba & Pombal, 2007; Marin, González, & Smeets, 1997; 
Wilczynski & Northcutt, 1983).  
  
B. Constructive criticisms 
   
Just as we ourselves have trouble mastering the intricate brains of insects, K & B struggle 
with the complex structure and terminology of vertebrate brains. Perhaps this is because 
Merker (2007), their main source, is not a simple read, with its added flourishes, new 
synonyms, and neologisms along with its many original ideas. Adopting Merker’s 
“behavorial core control system” (BCCS) as the site of primary consciousness and actions, K 
& B consider this BCCS to comprise much of the midbrain and diencephalon, plus the basal 
ganglia (see their Figure 1B). However, they often misleadingly call it all the “midbrain,” 
even though it is much more than that. The real midbrain is shown in yellow in our Figure 1; 
it contains only a few of the BCCS elements. At other times, K & B call it “midbrain and basal 
ganglia,” which is better, but that name omits the diencephalon. Thus, as their BCCS they 
actually mean “basal ganglia plus midbrain+diencephalon” (with the latter shown as a gray 
S-band in Figure 3 of Merker, 2007). The imprecise naming forces the reader to do a lot of 
mental translation to understand the structures meant. Perhaps K & B can straighten out 
the wording when presenting their ideas in the future. As an aid, our book includes a primer 
on vertebrate brain anatomy and terminology (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a), so it can help 
scientists to make more precise comparisons between vertebrate and insect brains. To this 
end, our book avoids the traditional overemphasis on mammalian brains, centering on the 
more relevant brains of the basally evolved fishes and amphibians.    
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Figure 1: Generalized vertebrate brain. We argue that K & B have not included enough brain areas 
in their core region for primary consciousness and behavioral control. They often call it “midbrain” 
(actually just the subpart shown in yellow) but they mean “midbrain + diencephalon + basal ganglia” 
(all regions shown in the red, blue, yellow and green). The regions for affective consciousness and its 
directed actions (stippling) must be included as well. Thanks to Jill K. Gregory for the art.    
 
It seems to us that K & B, like Merker, put too much emphasis on the unity and integration 
of consciousness, as if it were one thing generated by a spatially confined “core” brain 
region. We on the other hand see consciousness as diverse, with semi-distinct exteroceptive, 
interoceptive, and affective aspects originating from different brain regions that are widely 
distributed (although interconnected and intercommunicating).  
 
We can anticipate a rebuttal to this criticism. That is, K & B do say that primary 
consciousness has several aspects, as adopted from Merker (see Figure 1A in K & B, 2016). 
The first of these aspects is “environmental state and structure,” which is our exteroceptive 
consciousness of mapped mental simulations of the outside world, as built from the 
distance senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, etc. Their second aspect is “state of self,” which 
is the sensory awareness of internal physiological processes that we called interoceptive 
consciousness. Their third aspect is consciously sensing self-movements through 
proprioception and the sense of balance. And their fourth is the contribution of memories to 
the conscious experience. We have not explicitly put these third and fourth aspects into our 
scheme but we recognize their importance in primary consciousness (pp. 114 and 210, 
Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a), so we heartily support including them.  
 
Whereas both K & B and ourselves subdivided consciousness, K & B could have done more 
to analyze whether the different aspects relate to different regions in the insect brain. Their 
analysis misses, or at least underemphasizes, the important aspect of affective 
consciousness of dislikes and likes. In vertebrates, affective consciousness mostly involves 
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brain regions different from those of the exteroceptive consciousness of the external world 
(Figure 1; also see Chapters 6-8, Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a).  
 
Of course, all aspects of consciousness become united in the end before they reach one’s 
experience — we realize that. Our points are just that in the future (1) it will help to 
examine the insect brain for the specific subparts associated with interoceptive, 
exteroceptive, and affective consciousness; and (2) the affective component should be given 
more emphasis, to allow better comparison with vertebrate brains.  
 
C. Merker under the microscope 
 
Some of the strengths of K & B’s thesis, as well as some of its weaknesses, can be traced to 
its foundation in Merker’s work. Only by closely analyzing Merker can one find how to make 
the valuable hypothesis of insect consciousness even better.  
 
C1. Strengths. Merker (2005, 2007) was a trailblazer, formulating a theory of how 
consciousness evolved in the tectum of the earliest vertebrates years before we and other 
workers published this conclusion (Feinberg, 2012; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; Packard & 
Delafield-Butt, 2014). Besides coming up with the idea that consciousness served to 
simulate the spatial environment as the fishlike pre-vertebrates swam through it, he also 
saw that sharp vision was the first of the vertebrate distance senses to evolve (pp. 69-70, 
Merker, 2007), a feat for which we did not give him enough credit in past works (Feinberg & 
Mallatt, 2013; 2016a,b).  
 
Merker’s “reafference” theory of the origin of primary consciousness is quite good; K & B 
also present it well. The theory says that for swimming pre-vertebrates to see an object as 
fixed and steady while their swimming movements swivelled their heads, they evolved 
tectum-based reflexes for compensatory eye movements so the gaze stayed on one point. 
Next, as other distance senses evolved for monitoring sounds, vibrations and electrical 
fields in the water, these sensory inputs also reached the tectum, as fully aligned with the 
mapped visual input. The integrated multisensory mapping evolved not only to enrich the 
information content of the spatial sensory image but also because, “For active animals with 
well-developed spatial senses, it is computationally more effective to resolve the 
reafference problem once in a unified sensory model than to resolve it in a dispersed and 
peripheral way for each sense independently” (p. 3, K & B). Whereas Merker (2007, p. 69) 
documented reafference in mammals, Barron & Klein (2016, p. 5) documented it in the 
visual system of insects (also see Kim, Fitzgerald, & Maimon, 2015).    
 
Another strength of Merker is pointing out that children born without a cerebral cortex (a 
condition called hydranencephaly) still show strong signs of emotional expression. This is 
good evidence that affective consciousness arises subcortically in “limbic” structures in 
humans (Aleman & Merker, 2014; Nieuwenhuys, 1996). But consciousness has different 
subtypes, so it does not follow that human exteroceptive consciousness also arises 
subcortically like this.  
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C2. Weaknesses.  
 
The claim that mammalian primary consciousness is tectal not cortical. Only mammals have 
an elaborated cerebral cortex, or neocortex, of the pallial forebrain. By contrast, other 
vertebrates have either a differently elaborated pallium (e.g., birds, galeomorph sharks, 
hagfish), or a simpler, less elaborated pallium (amphibians and most fishes). Most 
investigators have for centuries located consciousness in the cerebral cortex. To this day, 
the dominant paradigm in consciousness studies is that primary consciousness of mapped 
mental images in mammals comes from the cerebral cortex or from interactions between 
the cortex and the thalamus, not from the superior colliculus/tectum as Merker claims. We 
agree with the dominant paradigm for mammals because so many of the neural correlates 
of mammalian exteroceptive consciousness are in this corticothalamic system (Koch, 
Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016). Medical neuroimaging and brain-lesion studies strongly 
support cortical consciousness when the results are interpreted in the most direct and 
straightforward way: damage to the cortex leads to loss of some sensory consciousness 
(Boly et al., 2013; Feinberg, 2009). Destruction of the visual, occipital, cortex causes 
blindness in primates. In his argument for tectal instead of cortical consciousness, Merker 
(2007) said that these loss phenomena are more complex than they appear, that the cortical 
damage actually inhibits the conscious role of the superior colliculus, etc. However, his 
interpretation is less parsimonious and therefore it requires extraordinary counterevidence 
to be believed. The indirect counterevidence that Merker provided — on the “Sprague 
effect” (p. 67) and on the cortex projecting to the superior colliculus (p. 76) — does not 
seem definitive enough to topple the dominant view of cortical consciousness in mammals.  
 
K & B recognize that most neurobiologists reject Merker’s unorthodox idea of tectal 
consciousness in mammals, but they defend it with the argument that there is a distinction 
between the contents of consciousness (from cerebral cortex) and the capacity for it (in 
superior colliculus). Yet this seems confusing. How could consciousness exist if it had no 
contents?  
 
Our own solution to the problem raised by the convincing evidence for cortical 
consciousness is that the consciousness shifted from the tectum to the enlarging cerebral 
cortex when mammals evolved from their reptile-like ancestors. A more precise way to say 
this is that all non-olfactory exteroceptive consciousness shifted, some parts of 
interoceptive consciousness shifted, and cognitive control over affective consciousness 
shifted from subcortical to cortical regions. We definitely agree, however, with Merker’s 
claim for tectal consciousness in the basally evolved vertebrate clades of fish and 
amphibians. In fact, much of our work has involved building the case for tectal 
consciousness in basal vertebrates. Moreover, to reiterate, we do accept Merker’s evidence 
from the hydranencephalic children that primary affective consciousness is not cortical but 
subcortical in every vertebrate — which we can say because most of the affect-associated 
brain structures are highly conserved across Vertebrata.     
 
In summary, here is how our conclusions compare to those of Merker, Barron, and Klein. 
Merker said the tectum is for exteroceptive consciousness of spatial images in mammals 
and all other vertebrates; he did not say much about affective or interoceptive 
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consciousness. We say the cerebral cortex is for exteroceptive consciousness in mammals, 
but the tectum has this role in fish and amphibians, while affective consciousness arises 
from subcortical structures in all vertebrates (shaded in Figure 1).  
 
Too mammal centered. As another possible weakness, Merker got almost all his evidence for 
midbrain+diencephalic consciousness, and for its origin in the first vertebrates, from these 
brain structures in humans and other mammals. This is ironic in light of the evidence just 
mentioned that mammals do not have tectal consciousness. Furthermore, the mammalian 
tectum has some potentially odd features: it is secondarily reduced in size, and its extensive 
back-and-forth communication with the cerebral cortex is unique among vertebrates (p. 
122, Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a). The brains of the fish and amphibians that may actually 
have tectal consciousness should have been considered more (Nieuwenhuys, ten Donkelaar, 
& Nicholson, 1998), even though they are less studied than mammalian brains. To his credit, 
Merker built his ideas on the most conserved brain regions of mammals, the regions that all 
vertebrates possess, and this proved fruitful. In the end, luck was involved because the 
mammalian superior colliculus proves not to be so odd and it performs many tectal 
functions that are universal among vertebrates. It has some value as a model after all. 
However, quite a bit is now known about the tecta of fish and amphibians, with the tecta of 
lampreys and zebrafish being especially informative (Bianco & Engert, 2015; Kardamakis, 
Saitoh, & Grillner, 2015; Northmore, 2011; Saidel, 2009). For more on the optic tecta of all 
vertebrates see our book (pp. 108-111, Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016a,). 
 
Missed the basal ganglia for action control. Merker did not include enough about the basal 
ganglia in his “behavioral core control system” for primary consciousness and action 
control. This is not meant to fault him because he was writing before the central role of the 
basal ganglia in action selection and behavioral motivation was widely appreciated. Instead, 
he assigned these functions to the periaqueductal gray of the midbrain and the 
hypothalamus. Actually, he did bring in a small part of the “action-related” basal ganglia, 
namely, the midbrain’s substantial nigra (p. 71, Merker, 2007), but this was briefly stated, 
not mentioned further, and is not shown in the summary figures of his 
midbrain+diencephalic core.  
 
K & B recognized the absolute necessity of adding all the basal ganglia to Merker’s action-
centered hypothesis, and they did it well. However, most of the basal ganglia lie up in the 
telecephalon, which expands the behavioral core uncomfortably, far beyond the tight 
midbrain+diencephalic zone envisioned by Merker.  
 
Merker’s brain system was much too small. The newer literature has identified many more 
parts of the vertebrate brain for controlling actions, and many more brain regions for 
affective consciousness (Figure 1). More specifically, O’Connell & Hoffman (2011) identified 
a decision-making network in the vertebrate brain. This has two parts. The first part is a 
mesolimbic reward system for evaluating the salience of external stimuli. This system brings 
in telencephalic structures such as the ventral pallidum (pleasure hot spot), a part of the 
amygdala (“fear almond”), plus the dopaminergic VTA (ventral tegmental area of the 
midbrain). The second part is a social-behavioral network that regulates adaptive behavioral 
actions and includes more parts of the hypothalamus, the midbrain’s periaqueductal gray, 
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plus the lateral septal nucleus of the forebrain. Again, all this is much more than Merker’s 
small region at the top of the brainstem; it even includes parts of the cerebral cortex 
because in mammals the hippocampus and some of the amygdala technically belong to the 
cortex.  
 
The challenge this expansion offers to K & B is that it presents many more vertebrate brain 
regions whose insect analogues must be found in order to complete their hypothesis of 
primary consciousness and action selection in insects. We are confident that such matches 
can be made, but it makes the exercise more difficult, especially for matching the affective 
and memory regions in the brains of the two clades. As K & B recognized, there will also be 
differences; perfect one-to-one correspondence between insect and vertebrate structures is 
not to be expected. For example, do the memory-related amygdala and hippocampus of 
vertebrates resemble the memory-related mushroom bodies of insects, or do they resemble 
parts of the central complex, or the “protocerebrum” (Barron et al., 2015; Krashes et al., 
2009; Plath & Barron, 2014)?   
 
D. Homology or convergence? 
 
In Section 4 of their paper K & B parallel us in showing that the conscious brain regions 
existed in both the first arthropods and the first vertebrates of about 520 million years ago. 
Then they asked whether this means that the common ancestor of these two clades was 
conscious. They are non-committal but lean toward a qualified “yes.”   
 
 “It is presently unclear whether the insect and vertebrate behavioral core control 
systems evolved independently. Strausfeld and Hirth (2013) have argued for a deep 
homology between the insect CX and associated structures and vertebrate basal 
ganglia. If this interpretation is correct, it would imply that a form of behavioral core 
control system may even predate the divergence of these groups.” (p. 8)  
 
We take the “no” view. Arthropods and vertebrates are only distantly related; they are 
phylogenetically separated by many clades of animals with simpler nervous systems. This is 
shown in Figure 2. It indicates that conscious brains arose independently in the pre-
arthropods and pre-vertebrates with the similarities explained by convergent evolution. We 
have also examined the large-brained and behaviorally sophisticated coleoid cephalopods 
such as octopuses and squids, and concluded that these molluscs are likely to be conscious. 
They are not closely related to arthropods or vertebrates, indicating that consciousness 
evolved independently a third time.  
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Figure 2: Consciousness (C) evolved independently in vertebrates and arthropods, as shown by 
the distant relation of these two clades (Dunn, Giribet, Edgecombe, & Hejnol, 2014). Cephalopods 
evolved consciousness independently again.  
 
E. Fine-tuning the hypothesis 
 
Here are our recommendations for adjusting the hypothesis of insect consciousness, fixing 
some of its rough parts and telling how it may be used and expanded in future inquiry.  
 
Keep the good foundational idea: increasing mobility aided the evolution of primary 
consciousness in arthropods and vertebrates because consciousness simulates the world so 
that these animals can accurately navigate and explore their environment. Consciousness 
directs motile behaviors so the conscious and action-control networks have always been 
physically near each other in the brain.  
 
The proposed correspondence of insect CX with vertebrate tectum as the site of primary 
consciousness of sensory images rings true. However, on the vertebrate side it only applies 
to the ancestral condition shown in fish and amphibians, given the likelihood that in 
mammals the cerebral cortex is for this type of consciousness. Thus, future comparisons 
should use fish data wherever possible.  
 
The proposed correspondence of insect CX and “protocerebrum” with vertebrate basal 
ganglia as the site of action selection seems very good. Features of the basal ganglia are 
highly conserved across all vertebrates (Grillner, Robertson, & Stephenson-Jones, 2013), 
meaning the literature’s heavy focus on mammals will not confuse this comparison. 
 
Separate out affective consciousness and seek more of the affective brain sites in insects. 
The same could be done for interoceptive consciousness, sensing of the gut and internal-
body states. Affects are often associated with distinctive neuromodulators and 
neurotransmitters, making it easier to identify corresponding sites across animal taxa. 
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Locate the particular regions associated with positive versus negative affects in the insect 
brain.  
 
Realize that even if further study of insect brains finds more similarities with vertebrates, 
the concept of a unified “behavioral core control system” might fall apart. In the vertebrates 
this BCCS is much more widespread than originally proposed, with many more brain 
regions. If this also holds for insects, then it may prove impossible to call anything so 
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